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EXCLUSIVITY AND THE JAPANESE BAR: ETHICS OR
SELF-INTEREST?
David Hood
Abstract: The Japanese bar maintains that ethical considerations mandate a low
admission rate. However, the bar's limit on the number of lawyers in Japan has
socioeconomic effects that extend beyond the legal profession. Also, because there are
too few Japanese lawyers, "quasi-lawyer" legal substitutes have emerged to satisfy pentup demand for legal services. This comment suggests that the Japanese bar should
expand its membership in order to address the shortage of legal services in Japan. An
expanded bar could also address many of Japan's hidden socioeconomic ills.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Legal commentators have devoted much discussion to the exclusive
posture of the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations (Nichibenren). The
main issue internationally, and particularly in the United States, has been
the inability of foreign lawyers to practice and form associations in Japan.'
However, the prohibition against foreign lawyers working in Japan is just
one aspect of the wider attempt by the state and the bar to limit entry into
the Japanese legal market. Barriers to entry into the Japanese legal
profession confront not only foreign lawyers, but also the many Japanese
college graduates who attempt unsuccessfully to become lawyers.
The Legal Examination, the rite of passage into Nichibenren, is
notoriously difficult.
Only 500 of the over 20,000 candidates
(approximately 2 percent) pass the annual exam (see Appendix).2 This
process has given Japan one of the lowest ratios of lawyers to population in
the industrial world. There were 11,466 registered practicing attorneys in
Japan in 1980. With a population of approximately 116 million, this gave
Japan a ratio of one practicing attorney to 10,000 persons. This ratio is only
See, e.g., Abrahams, Japan'sBar to US Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., July 4, 1983, at 1; Fukuhara, The
Status of ForeignLawyers in Japan, 17 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 21 (1973); Kosugi, Regulation of Practice
by ForeignLawyers, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 678 (1979); Ohira & Stevens, Alien Lawyers in the United States
and Japan-A Comparative Study, 39 WASH. L. REV. 412 (1964); Comment, An American Lawyer in
Tokyo: Problems ofEstablishinga Practice,2 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 180 (1983).
2 Kahei Rokumoto, The Present State of Japanese Practicing Attorneys: On the Way to Full
Professionalization?,in 2 LAW. IN SOC'Y 160, 165 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1988); Peter
Landers, The Mother ofAll Bar Exams: JapaneseSpend Years on Test; About 2 Percent Pass, L.A. DAILY
J., July 29, 1991, at BI.
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one-sixth of that found in England and West Germany in the same year,3
and is in stark contrast to that of the United States; in 1980, 542,205
licensed attorneys gave the US a ratio of one attorney to every 403 persons.4
The small number of candidates from which to draw attorneys, judges
and procurators contributes to the non-litigious nature of Japanese society.
Some see this lack of "institutional capacity" as the main reason Japanese
are not more willing to avail themselves of the legal system. 5 Other
commentators would offer a cultural explanation which describes the
Japanese citizen as a reluctant litigant.6 Whichever emphasis one adopts, it
is clear that limited access to a small legal market has some impact on the
rate of litigation in Japan.
Yet the small size of the Japanese bar affects more than just the rate
of litigation. The exclusive nature of Nichibenren may impact its members'
ethics, as well as reduce the ability of Japanese lawyers to perform their
function as protectors of human and civil rights.7 In order to analyze the net
effect of the size of Nichibenren, one must first look at the largely historical
reasons for the Japanese bar's exclusivity.
II.

HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE LEGAL PROFESSION

The Japanese lawyer has a history of vulnerability, low prestige,
limited function, and subservience to the state.8 The Japanese lawyer did
not play an important role in the Meiji restoration period (1868-1912). 9
"[T]he lawyer was not a figure of importance either as a participant in the
molding of the new order or as an upholder of the traditional order."'"
Professor Rabinowitz further stated that, as the Japanese legal profession is
a relatively new institution, it is "impossible for the lawyer to 'borrow'

Rokumoto, supranote 2, at 163.
The Lawyer Explosion, 81 A.B.A. J. 37 (Mar. 1995).
John 0. Haley, The Myth ofthe Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. OF JAPANESE STUD. 359, 378 (1978).

'
6

See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY

(1995) (discussing the contribution of societal trust towards harmony in Japan); Takeyoshi Kawashima,
Dispute Resolution in ContemporaryJapan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY
41, 43 (Arthur von Mehren ed., 1963).
7 Article I of the Attorney Code of Ethics places upon the Japanese attorney the responsibility
for
Japanese human and civil rights. Setsuo Miyazawa, lecture at U. of Washington, Feb. 20, 1996.
' Richard W. Rabinowitz, The Historical Development of the JapaneseBar, 70 HARV. L. REv. 61,

64(1956).
9
0

Sherill A. Leonard, Attorney Ethics and the Size of the Japanese Bar, 39 JAPAN Q. 86, 87 (1992).
Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 79.
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prestige from a traditional role model of high status."" Generally, the
Japanese attorney has not been an effective or important advocate of the
Japanese people's rights and freedoms.' 2
Traditional Japanese jurisprudence allowed legal representation only
in exceptional circumstances, such as cases in which infancy, advanced age
or illness were an issue.' 3 In 1854, the function of the lawyer was viewed as
accompanying people to court and writing documents for them. 4 Under
Japanese law at the time, some form of relationship was required between
legal representative and litigant.' 5 Innkeepers (kujishi) could provide such a
relationship. They were the first class of legal representatives in Japan,
although they had no legal training. 6
While they had no official
recognition, they were allowed to act as counselor for clients who had
traveled to the Tokyo court and were staying in their inn.' 7 Court officials
viewed the kujishi with suspicion, and their reputations were generally very
poor.' 8
The daigennin appeared in the period from 1872 to 1893. They were
officially recognized legal representatives at civil trials. 9 Initially, there
20
were no qualifications for acting as a daigennin; anyone was free to do so.
The daigenninalso had no formal training, and until 1876, they did not even
have to pass a legal examination. 21 The daigennin were held in low esteem,
a perception which continues to impact the public image of the Japanese
lawyer to the present day.22
Two sets of legislation gave the status of the legal profession a boost
in 1880. The first was an amendment to the Criminal Code which
Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 79.

2 Gino Dal Pont, The Social Status of the Legal Professions in Japan and the United States: A

Structuraland CulturalAnalysis, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 291, 293 (1995).
"
Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 62.
'4 Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 62.
" Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 62.
6 Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 62-64.
' In the Genroku Period (1688-1703), the Administrative and Tax Office for the Kanto area was
located in a part of Tokyo which also housed a number of temples. The temples attracted many tourists,

and several inns opened in the area to service both tourists and litigants. Over time, the kujishi developed
familiarity with the procedures of the Tokyo court, allowing them to advise their guests on legal matters.
Rabinowitz, supranote 8, at 62-63; Setsuo Miyazawa, lecture at U. of Washington (Feb. 16, 1996).
" The public perceived the kujishi as an intermediary through which government officials could be

bribed. Also, the public thought that the kujishi would pad their client's bill at the inn by prolonging the
trial unnecessarily. Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 62-64.
"

Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 64.

20 Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 64.
21 Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 65.
22 Leonard, supra note 9, at 87.
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recognized the right of the defendant to representation at a criminal trial.23
The procurator, the state's representative at trial, had the prestige of being a
governmental official. By participating in criminal trials along side the
procurators, the daigennin received a modicum of that official status by
association.24
Second, the government took control of the examination system and
required that a formal bar association be established at each district court.
These ties between the daigenninand the government lent further credibility
25
to the nascent lawyer class.
The next important piece of legislation, the Lawyer's Law, came in
1893.26 The bengoshi (as lawyer were then called) were further legitimized
by governmental regulation of the legal profession; these regulations
established examination rules and admission standards, and defined
acceptable behavior.27 However, in the same legislation the government
made clear who had power: the Lawyer's Law placed each local bar under
the control of the chief procurator of the district. 2 Thus, while officially
enjoying a parallel status to that of the procurators in court, the bengoshi
remained in a subservient position. However, the newly found legitimacy
of the bengoshi was soon threatened by their subsequent actions.
An oversupply of lawyers brought about intense competition in the
legal profession in the 1920s.
Many bengoshi were in dire straits
financially, and some resorted to misdeeds in order to compete. 29 Their
public image threatened, a consensus developed among Japanese attorneys
that the size of the bar should be reduced in order to eliminate the unethical
lawyers as well as the competition among lawyers which was seen as the
basis of the ethical problems. 30 Facing domestic opposition from the
government, the Japanese bar would not achieve their goal of limiting the
number of lawyers until an outside force-the occupying American Army
-took control.

24

25
26
22
21

Ministry of Justice, Order No. 1 (1880), cited in Rabinowitz, supranote 8, at 67.
Leonard, supra note 9, at 88.
Leonard, supranote 9, at 87.
Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 69-71.
Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 69-71.
Leonard, supranote 9, at 88.

29 Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 74 n. 17 (citing conduct such as fraudulent appropriation of funds
and even criminal acts).
30 The reputation of the nascent lawyer class was so threatened that lawyers themselves began to call

for investigations into unethical or illegal acts by lawyers. The solution most often suggested was to
reduce the number of bar members. Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 73-74.
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In an attempt to modernize Japanese law, two important legal
institutions were established in the post-World War II period: Nichibenren,
a legally autonomous national bar; and the Legal Training and Research
Institute ("LTRI"). Nichibenren was given the task of overseeing the local
bar associations. The LTRI, under the control of the Supreme Court,
provided training to judges, procurators and-for the first time-lawyers.
While provision of formal government legal training for private lawyers
completed the legitimization of the bengoshi, it also solidified governmental
control over the legal profession. 3'
Until the 1960s, the Japanese lawyer had no cause to fear that
governmental control; the societal views of lawyer and bureaucrat were
largely analogous. However, the attitude of some lawyers changed from
simple conformity to civil disobedience during the socially tumultuous days
of the 1960s.32 As criminal trials followed the Japan-US Mutual Security
Treaty riots, attorneys began to engage in what were correctly perceived as
acts of civil disobedience.33 To combat what they perceived as judicial bias
in favor of the government, defense lawyers "adopted delaying tactics,
defied court instructions, and even resigned from their cases in displays of
utter contempt for the treatment of their clients." 34 This "unlawyerly"
behavior left the government with at least two possibilities: subject
Nichibenren to stringent government regulation, or bypass Nichibenren
altogether. The government opted to attempt legislation allowing criminal
trials to proceed without defense counsel.35
The message from the
government was clear-trials would proceed and justice would be achieved
with or without the help of the bar.36
Faced with the potential loss of its autonomy, the bar capitulated. It
issued a public apology for the unruly behavior that some of its members
had exhibited.37 It also pledged to control more closely the future conduct
of its members and to tighten the ethical rules governing when a lawyer may
quit his or her defense of a client. Following two decades of internal
disagreement as to the substance of the ethical revisions, in 1990 the bar

"

Leonard, supra note 9, at 88.

32 Leonard, supra note 9, at 88-89.

3 Leonard, supra note
34 Leonard, supra note
3' Leonard, supra note
36 Leonard, supra note
3 Leonard, supra note

9,
9,
9,
9,
9,

at 89.
at 89.
at 89.
at 89.
at 89.
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finally adopted modest changes.3" However, the revisions serve as a
reminder to the bar that it can remain autonomous only so long as lawyers
act in ways not offensive to the government. Nichibenren continues to
operate in this context today.
III.

NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE SIZE OF NCHIBENREN

In 1987, Nichibenren, the Ministry of Justice, and the Supreme Court
(the "Legal Three") entered into negotiations concerning the expansion of
the size of the bar.3 9 The negotiations resulted in an agreement last year
which will increase the annual class of LTRI students. To accomplish this,
the number of candidates who pass the annual Legal Examination will be
increased by changing the cut off point for passage.4 ° While all parties to
the negotiation appear to accept that some increase is needed, they differ as
to what the annual increase should be. The Justice Ministry and the
Supreme Court had proposed that the annual number of those passing the
examination be increased to 1,500, up from its current level of 700. 4'
Nichibenren, following long internal debate, ultimately compromised with
the Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court at the level of 1,000 successful
candidates per year.42
The size of the bar became a political issue at the instigation of the
Japanese government. While lawyers are in short supply in Japan, judges
are in even greater demand. There is one judge for every 60,000 people in
Japan.43 Currently, because judges in Japan have huge caseloads, the
Ministry of Justice desires to increase the number of judges in coming
years.44 To achieve this goal, the Ministry must expand the pool of
potential judges and thus the size of the bar. As Nichibenren is an
autonomous entity, the Ministry of Justice must convince it to expand the
bar in order to expand the judiciary or increase the number of procurators.
However, should Nichibenren refuse to adopt changes to the satisfaction of
"s The new rules define under what circumstances a lawyer may resign a case. Leonard, supra note

9, at 89.
9 Landers, supra note 2, at BI.
40 Landers, supra note 2, at B I.

Haruo Shimada, Nation's Legal System Doesn't Provide Equal Justice for All: Greater Protection
Neededfor Indigents, Social Outcasts, NIKKEI WKLY., Dec. 18, 1995, available in NEXIS, Asiapc Library,
JAPAN file.
42

Id.

41 Compare this with the ratios in Germany (I per 4,000 people), the United
States (I per 8,000),

France (I per 12,000), and the United Kingdom (I per 30,000). Id.
44 Setsuo Miyazawa, supra note
17.
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the Ministry of Justice, there is a real possibility that the government might
simply take control of the bar. 45 Thus, in order to ward off any loss of
autonomy, the incentive for Nichibenren is to accede, at least to some
degree, to the Ministry of Justice's wishes. Of interest are Nichibenren's
justifications for a small bar.
A.

Maintain Quality

A common rationale of Nichibenren for limiting bar size is to protect
the consumer from low quality services. 6 Consumers are easily deceived,
the argument goes, and they must be protected from information
asymmetries. However, the ban on advertising adopted by Nichibenren
seems counter-intuitive in this instance. If asymmetry of information is the
problem, the way to solve the problem is to provide more, not less,
information to the consumer. That would seem to entail allowing lawyers to
advertise. 4
Today lawyers are understandably reluctant to endorse any change
which might once again lead to the problems of over-competition
experienced in the 1920s.' 8 Concerns over maintaining economic wellbeing and elite status are often couched in ethical terms. The concepts of a
small bar size, high ethical standards, and high-quality lawyers are
synonymous in the minds of many Japanese lawyers. "Too many lawyers,"
says one Tokyo attorney, "would lead to a lowering of the quality of
service. Both competence and character would suffer. What people expect
49
of lawyers would decline, and so lawyer's standards would decline, too.
Explains a Nagasaki attorney, "The great0 threat to the ethical character of
5
the profession is excessive competition."

4' Setsuo Miyazawa, supra note 17.
Ramseyer, Lawyers, Foreign Lawyers, and Lawyer-Substitutes: The Market for

46 J. Mark

Regulation in Japan,27 HARV. INT. L.J. 499, 512. (1986).
47 Information asymmetries result when one party to a potential bargain has greater access to or
control over relevant information than another party to that bargain. The information-deficient party may

be unable to discern the actual costs of the bargain, or may have to spend more to determine those costs.
See, e.g, THRAINN EGGERTSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR OF INSTITUTIONS 62-64 (1990) (demonstrating

information asymmetry costs in a hypothetical market example). Information asymmetries are thus a form
of transaction costs. Id., at 15 (describing a transaction cost as "[tihe search for information about ... price
and quality ....

).

See supra, notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
9 Leonard, supra note 9, at 90.
Leonard, supra note 9, at 90.

'o
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In becoming a lawyer, candidates must navigate a very challenging
course. On average, candidates spend seven years after college preparing for
the legal examination through "cram" courses." Then, a candidate must
score in the top few percent of the thousands of annual applicants. The
average age of successful candidates is 29.52 Thus, argue the supporters of
the status quo, those candidates who lack the intellectual and moral
conviction to complete this arduous path will be weeded out.5 3 Lowering
the standard in order to accept more candidates compromises the process,
leading to lower quality and ethical standards for the legal profession
overall.
B.

MaintainElite Status

The real impetus for the Japanese lawyer to support a smaller bar size
may be a desire to protect their position in society as an educational elite.
Michitaka Goto stated that, "[t]raditionally, the legal system has a great deal
of pride that it is the cream of the crop. If there were too many lawyers, this
elite consciousness would be lost."54 While they are occasionally haunted
by the ghosts of their low-status predecessors (the kujishi and daigennin),
today's Japanese lawyers enjoy a level of education and professional
freedom that is unparalleled in Japanese society."
C.

Maintain Confidence

Competition, in the minds of Japanese attorneys, leads also to a loss
of public confidence." Proponents of maintaining the present bar size point
to scandals which have rocked the legal profession over the past few years
as indicators of what would be the likely result should examination
standards be lowered.5 7 Japan has had several well-publicized cases of
attorney corruption, dishonesty and general misconduct, such as the Toyoda
"

Leonard, supra note 9, at 89-93.

52

Ramseyer, supra note 46, at 524.

" Leonard, supra note 9, at 90.
4 Landers, supra note 2.

" The legal profession provides the Japanese attorney much more autonomy than is found in more
traditional forms of Japanese employment. The desire to avoid the hierarchical structure of the Japanese
corporation is a major factor contributing to the desirability of the legal profession in Japan. Interview
with John 0. Haley, Professor of Law, U. of Washington, in Seattle, WA. (Apr. 23, 1996).
56 Leonard, supra note 9, at 9 1.
"
Leonard, supra note 9, at 9 1.
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Shoji scandal of the mid-1980s.5" Yet, the absolute level of reported
attorney misconduct is surprisingly low. From 1979 to 1990, Nichibenren
59
received and acted on only 2,291 complaints of attorney misconduct.
Thus, while overall levels of reported attorney misconduct in Japan are very
low in relation to the levels in other developed nations, the Japanese public
still perceives the Japanese legal profession as less than pristine.
Nichibenren furthered this perception of the Japanese legal profession
by not releasing the details of an attorney's misconduct when he or she was
disciplined by the bar.60 In 1991, Nichibenren took a positive step towards
improving its public image and abandoned this policy: the bar now releases
61
the name, ethical violation and punishment of any disciplined member.
By making the disciplinary process more transparent, the bar has increased
its legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
D.

MaintainEthics

Another commonly cited reason for Nichibenren opposition to an
increased bar size is attorney ethics. They argue that within a small, closeknit community, attorneys are able to keep a watchful eye on each other for
possible ethical violations. 62 Any increase in the size of the bar would,
according to this view, diminish the oversight capabilities of the bar.
This method of enforcement works well in the rural areas of Japan,
where there is a clear sense of community among the practicing attorneys,
judges and procurators.63 A Nagasaki attorney echoed this view. "Most
ethical problems are in the major cities. In smaller cities, we have a sense
of community .... We see each other's faces, we know each other's names
and we know each other's 64cases and how we will handle them. There is a
lot of mutual supervision."
5,The scandal involved the 1985 bankruptcy of the Toyoda Shoji trading firm, which had made over
100 billion yen worth of fraudulent gold sales to 28,000 people. Investors recovered only ten percent of
their investments. Several Japanese attorneys were implicated and later disciplined by the bar. Many
criminal prosecutions befell the officials of Toyoda Shoji. Jottings, THE DAILY YOMIURI, June 13, 1992, at
3.
59 Leonard, supra note
60 Leonard, supra note
61 Leonard, supra note
62 Leonard, supra note
63 Leonard, supra note

9, at
9, at
9, at
9, at
9, at

91-92.
91.
91.
and urban legal communities).
90 (discussing the dynamics in rural
90.

" Leonard, supra note 9, at 90; see generally Kazuhiro Yonemoto, Shimane bengoshi-kai--tadaima
kaiin niuichimei[The Shimane Bar Association: All Twenty-One Members Strong], translatedin 25 LAW
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However, there is much more need for attorney oversight in precisely
those areas where such a small legal community does not exist, such as in
the larger urban areas. To quote a Tokyo attorney involved in the revising
of the Code of Ethics:
The Tokyo area is where a great amount of misconduct is
found. So the merit of a small bar, which allows attorneys to
criticize and oversee one another and to keep standards high,
no longer exists in Tokyo. In rural areas, with 100 or so
attorneys, there is a great fear of embarrassment in front of
one's colleagues. Attorneys know each other too well to
overlook wrongdoing. There is a watchful eye.65
Part of the theoretical appeal of this romantic notion of attorney selfoversight may derive from the time attorneys spend at the LTRI. Nakabo
Kohei, former president of Nichibenren, described the need for a "herd"
mentality among the students at the Institute. "I've been saying to lawyers
throughout the country since I've come to Nichibenren that we should all be
in herds. If you're in a herd, you'll see this person on your right and
another on your left and eventually you will learn to see what your own
location is by experience. '' 66 The problem attorney, in Kohei's mind, is the
loner. "If you look at a lawyer who's ended up in trouble, you'll see that
he's been by himself. The common feature of this kind of lawyer is that
they are solitary and never listen to others' opinions. In short, they are like
a lost child. They do not know where they are.,"67 The assumption which
underlies such comments is that the competent lawyer will also be an ethical
lawyer. Thus, the argument goes, if the standard for passage of the legal
examination is watered down, less qualified-and thus less ethicalcandidates will become lawyers.
As an alternative to resisting expansion of its membership, one step
the bar could take to strengthen its commitment to high ethical standards
would be to adopt a detailed code of ethics. Yet because the Japanese legal
profession relies on the fiction of community oversight to assure adherence
to ethical standards, any detailed ethical standards seem redundant. As one
IN JAPAN 115 (Daniel H. Foote trans., 1995) (describing the daily interactions of lawyers in the small bar of
Shimane).
6 Leonard, supra note 9, at 90.
66 Sunday Mainichi, Oct. 28, 1990, 174, quoted in Leonard, supra note 9, at 94.
67 Sunday Mainichi, Oct. 28, 1990, 174, quoted in Leonard, supranote 9, at 94.
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student at the LTRI commented, "Most Japanese lawyers are not interested
in the subject of legal ethics. Internal values, not written rules, are
important., 68 This view was echoed by a district court judge:
As for career judges, who have passed the national exam and
received training, they understand what a judge is through
personal contact in the classroom, at social gatherings, and in
discussions with other judges. They receive "character," and
get in touch with their own character. Through experiencing
life, we understand how judges should behave. We don't need
lectures.69
Many attorneys view the code of ethics as entirely irrelevant. One
attorney observed, "[t]he content of the code, written or not, is common
knowledge in the lawyer's world, just as the Criminal Code has nothing to
do with common people's lives, yet they behave without knowing the
details of the law.",70 An attorney involved in the revision of the code of
ethics stated, "I'm not really sure what role the code has been playing.
One Tokyo attorney who prides
Maybe it has had no function at all.'
herself on her public service record said, "I've never consulted the Code of
Ethics. It's so general. It's too broad. It's almost like nothing., 72 It is
surprising to find that, in a legal system which has had relatively few
instances of ethical violations, lawyers are either so unconcerned or
unfamiliar with formal ethical rules.
However, some Japanese lawyers are critical of the informal way in
which lawyers are instructed about ethical questions. A former legal
lecturer commented that ethical instruction "is not done well enough. Legal
ethics education means little if you only give students the written code and
commentary. It should go hand in hand with practical work .... A twohour lecture is not enough., 73 A student at the LTRI commented that ethical
instruction was "too much by chance," depending more upon the nature of
the lawyer's employment than any organized educational curriculum.74
68 Leonard, supra note 9, at 94.
69 Leonard, supra note 9, at 94-95.
70 Leonard, supra note 9, at 95.

71 Leonard,
72 Leonard,
73 Leonard,
74 Leonard,

supra note 9, at 95.
supra note 9, at 95.
supra note 9, at 95.
supra note 9, at 95.
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Furthermore, the lack of a detailed code of ethics hurts not only
lawyers, but also their clients. Without clear guidelines, the Japanese public
must rely on the bar to police itself. In any dispute which might arise
between attorney and client, "ethereal" standards favor the former. One
attorney's comments are insightful: "There is a fear among attorneys here
that a stricter, more detailed code of ethics will increase the public's chance
to complain.""
It is possible that the low number of reported instances of attorney
misconduct may owe less to high ethical compliance and more to reluctance
to report violations. As Sherill Leonard wrote,
[c]lients may rarely lodge complaints against their attorneys
because they feel ill-equipped to pass judgment on the
attorney's performance; because they suspect that the bar will
close ranks to protect its own; or because they shrink away
from the unpleasantness associated with conflict, particularly if
the attorney was introduced by a friend, colleague, or boss.76
The issue of attorney ethics in Japan is one part of the larger debate
surrounding the size of the bar. Successful handling of the former may rely
upon the resolution of the latter.
IV.

NICHBENREN 'S FAILED ATTEMPT TO CARTELIZE THE LEGAL INDUSTRY

The bar, the government, and the main consumers of legal services
are pursuing their respective institutional self-interests through regulation of
the Japanese legal sector. 7 In particular, the bar attempted to cartelize legal
services but ultimately failed owing to the availability of legal substitutes.78
's Leonard, supra note 9, at 97.
76 Leonard, supra note 9, at 97-98.
7' Ramseyer, supra note 46,
at 501.
78

WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN & C. PAUL RODGERS II1, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE
198

(1992) define a cartel as an "arrangement among competitors, usually producers, which has the intention or
effect of limiting competition." Cartels may be relatively more successful in industries with few firms,
inelastic consumer demand, high entry barriers, and government support of industry arrangements. Id., at
185-6.

As demonstrated in the text, Nichibenren is composed of relatively few attorneys; the extreme

difficulty of the bar exam and the LTRI's small size constitute very high entry barriers; and the government

not only supports, but promulgates the industry arrangements. Thus, but for the availability of substitutes
for legal services and but for bar members who cheat on regulations (both discussed in the text),
Nichibenren has laid the foundation for a cartel; in turn, a cartel could increase information asymmetries
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In the end, only the interests of the state bureaucracy and the major
corporations are served by the small size of the bar.79
In Japan, several parties have an incentive to increase the membership
of the bar and liberalize the bar's regulations generally. As discussed
above, the Ministry of Justice is the main proponent of increasing
Nichibenren membership; this would allow the Ministry to increase the
number of procurators. 80 International lawyers are effectively excluded
from either practicing in Japan or forming associations with Japanese
lawyers and law firms.
Potentially, they could benefit from any
liberalization of the bar's regulation. Members of the general public,
whether they be disaffected consumers, injured workers, victims of sexual
harassment or other forms of discrimination would benefit by an increase in
the number of lawyers, which would do much to satisfy the pent-up public
demand for legal services. With an expansion of the number of successful
applicants for the legal examinations from 700 to 1,000, those extra 300
applicants per year are obviously well-served by the expanded bar
membership. Finally, those who would like to see the power of the
government challenged-opposition politicians, activist lawyers, and
certain academicians-would be encouraged by an expanded bar
membership so that the political status quo might be more readily
challenged. The most familiar examples of activist lawyers challenging the
state come from the field of environmental civil litigation.8
Perhaps more revealing is an analysis of which parties would not
benefit from liberalization of legal regulation. The Ministry of Finance,
which is responsible for the financing of the LTRI, would have to divert
82
more governmental funds towards training those extra Institute students.
Furthermore, bureaucrats and politicians generally benefit from the
relatively low rate of litigation in Japan. Few legal challenges mean greater

through unilateral, secret agreements on price terms, output, and quality.

C.f ERNEST GELLHORN &

WILLIAM E KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 157-60 (1994).

'9 See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
:0 Haley, supra note 55.

' See, e.g., Frank K. Upham, Litigation and Moral Consciousness in Japan: An Interpretive
Analysis of Four JapanesePollutionSuits, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 579 (1976). Expanding bar membership
might mean that Japan was becoming more of a sosho shakai (litigious society), though whether Japanese
society is intrinsically less litigious than other societies remains a hotly contested issue. See, e.g., JOHN 0.
HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 110 (1991).
2 Many in the public already ask why the government is in the business of paying for the training of
an educational and professional elite, especially given the instances of lawyer misconduct. Leonard, supra
note 9, at 91.
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freedom of action for the government.
The best way for the Japanese
government to limit the instances of potentially embarrassing litigation is to
limit the number of individuals who can bring such suits, though
bureaucrats are also immunized from the legal process by many doctrines,
such as justiciability, standing, and administrative discretion.84
For the most part, large corporations obtain their legal services from
their in-house legal departments, which are made up of non-lawyers.85
These corporations thus appear to be largely insulated from changes in the
regulation of the legal industry. Similarly, the insurance sector in Japan, by
successfully lobbying the government to allow it to resolve many claims
without resorting to the courts, has little incentive to see the present regime
changed.8 6
Other legal substitutes, such as judicial scriveners,
administrative scriveners, patent agents, tax agents, and public accountants
all benefit from the current regime. These substitutes satisfy much of the
excess demand for legal services which the small number of Japanese
lawyers are unable to provide the Japanese public.
Nichibenren members are also divided concerning the proper size of
their organization. In what will surely remain a fluid debate, one side of
Nichibenren desires to limit entry into the bar. This faction wants the bar to
exercise a monopoly over legal services.
They support the existing
regulatory regime for the legal industry, which includes 1) barriers to entry,
2) a ban on advertising, and 3) mandatory fee schedules.87 The first of the
three is the most severe and easily enforceable. The government controls
the formal barriers to entry.88 As such, those who violate the barriers are
s

Ramseyer, supra note 46, at 525-27.
Ramseyer, supra note 46, at 525.
Corporate counsel typically provides the strategic thinking and negotiation which goes into
business deals in Japan. Only when the final product needs to be legally consummated is an attorney
involved. Peter Landers, Japan's Few 'Real' Lawyers Just Bit Players, L.A. DAILY J., July 30, 1991, at
BI.
96
Insurance companies sought extra-legal means by which to settle suits arising from automobile
accidents, far the largest source of litigation in Japan. For a discussion of the handling of traffic accidents
in Japan, see Takao Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident Compensation in Japan,
24 LAW & Soc'y REv. 651 (1990) (giving data on traffic litigation and describing how the resolution of
these cases contributes to the non-litigious nature of Japanese society); Daniel H. Foote, Resolution of
Traffic Accident Disputes and JudicialActivism in Japan, 25 LAW IN JAPAN 19 (1995) (describing the way
in which the system for handling traffic disputes has developed).
87 Ramseyer, supra note 46, at 507.
The Ministry of Justice investigates and prosecutes those who violate the ban on unauthorized
legal practice. The Ministries of Finance and Justice together determine the size of the LTRI student body.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs controls the influx of foreign lawyers by limiting the number of available
visas.
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susceptible to criminal prosecution.89 The latter two regulations are less
readily enforceable and more routinely violated. While formally prohibited
from doing so, some Japanese attorneys advertise. 90
Likewise, the
mandatory fee schedule system can be very complicated, leading lawyers to
91
apply, misapply, or ignore the schedule altogether.
The bar's cartelization attempt effectively increased the price of legal
services without increasing their quality. 92 Because the supply of legal
services is restricted, existing services are bid up in price.
Thus,
maintaining high legal examination standards may increase the marginal
quality of legal services, the overall quality of legal services is decreased:
many consumers of legal services will use lower quality lawyer-substitutes,
such as judicial scriveners or tax agents, rather than compete for the scarce
attorney services.
Parties to a dispute can also litigate pro se. In only five percent of
Summary Court cases and forty percent of all district court trials have both
parties retained representation. 93 Those who do represent themselves in
court often have the benefit of out of court advice from lawyer-substitutes.94
Larger litigants, such as major corporations and insurance companies, which
encounter the possibility of litigation more regularly than the average
Japanese citizen, have institutionalized their lawyer-substitutes. 95
Corporations have their legal departments, and insurance companies have
their "settlement policies," both of which came about over the vociferous
96
opposition of the bar.
Japanese society has adapted to the shortage of legal services with a
variety of self help measures. The best example of this is rental deposits. In
order to rent a commercial space, a tenant must often make a deposit of two
to three years' rent; for residential arrangements, the deposit can climb as

Bengoshi ho [Attorneys Act], Law No. 205 of 1949, § 72.
Zadankai: Gendai no bengoshi katsudo (Roundtable: CurrentAttorney Activities), 611 JURSUTO
17, 21 (1976), cited in Ramseyer, supra note 46, at 510.
" Ramseyer, supra note 46, at 510.
9' Thus, Nichbenren can be seen to have satisfied some, if not all, of the preconditions for
cartelization. See ANDERSEN & RODGERS, supra note 78.
9" I SHIHO TOKE NEMPO: MINil, GYOSEI HEN [Annual Report of Judicial Statistics: Civil and
Administrative Cases] 155, 180-81 (Saiko saibanshojimuso kyoku ed. 1982), cited in Ramseyer, supra
note 46, at 517.
4 Ramseyer, supra note 46, at 517-519.
"
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
96 Ramseyer, supra note 46, at 518-19.
'o
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high as five years' rent.97 Another example of self help measures is the use
of introductions in many business and social settings. By pre-screening
potential parties to a transaction, the business or individual is able to take
advantage of a system of informal but very real social sanctions.
Nichibenren's self-aggrandizing regulation of the legal profession has
important effects on the whole of Japanese society. 98 The Japanese
bureaucracy operates on and promotes an image of public harmony and
17 Wayne Bums, Recognizing that Land Is Too Precious to Squander, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Mar. 8,
1984, at 48, 49-50; Charles Smith, Sitting On a Fortune in the World's Most Expensive Spot, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Feb. 28, 1985, at 55.
9' Self-aggrandizing or collusive action of this type has been studied by Mancur Olson. The
following tenets of Olson's general theory of collective action are highly applicable here:

I. There will be no countries that attain symmetrical organization of all groups with a common
interest and thereby attain optimal outcomes through comprehensive bargaining.
2. Stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to accumulate more collusions and
organizations for collective action over time.
3. Members of "small" groups have disproportionate organizational power for collective action,
and this disproportion diminishes but does not disappear over time in stable societies.
4. On balance, special-interest organizations and collusions reduce efficiency and aggregate
income in the societies in which they operate and make political like more divisive.
5. Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society in which they operate
more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute income to their members with as little excess
burden as possible, and to cease such redistribution unless the amount redistributed is substantial
in relation to the social cost of the redistribution.
6. Distributional coalitions make decisions more slowly than the individuals and firms of which
they are comprised, tend to have crowded agendas and bargaining tables, and more often fix
prices than quantities.
7. Distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and to
reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and thereby reduce the rate of economic
growth.
8. Distributional coalitions, once big enough to succeed, are exclusive, and seek to limit the
diversity of incomes and values of their membership.
9. The accumulation of distributional coalitions increases the complexity of regulation, the role
of government, and the complexity of understandings, and changes the direction of social
evolution.
When considering what effect the regulation of the Japanese legal profession has on the Japanese
society as a whole, the implications of Olson's tenets are fascinating and deserving of their own Comment.
MANCUR OLsoN, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONs 74 (1982).
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consensus.99 Any threat to these ideas, such as lawsuits against the
government, are to be discouraged to the fullest extent possible. The
discussion of harmony shifts attention away from the economic rationales
for the attempted cartel and focuses it squarely on culture. Ramseyer
criticizes this concept of harmony as rhetoric, stating that "[t]he myths of
harmony and hierarchy transform a potential price-fixing cartel and private
bureaucratic utility-maximizing strategy into a celebration of traditional
Japanese values."' 100 Thus, by discussing the regulation of the legal industry
in non-economic, normative terms, Japanese bureaucrats and lawyers are
able to conceal what is essentially a transfer of wealth.'
V.

CONCLUSION

Nichibenren membership seems destined to increase. Rather than
resist this change, Japanese lawyers should embrace it. By increasing its
ranks, the bar can reclaim much of the work which it has lost to the host of
legal substitutes available in contemporary Japan. By discarding the elitist
idea that only a small bar can be ethical, Japanese attorneys can increase not
only the size of their membership but also the visibility and transparency of
their ethical oversight, further enhancing the confidence the public has for
the legal profession.
Also, an expanded membership would allow the bar to fulfill its
mandate of protector of human and civil rights. A Tokyo attorney stated
that "[t]he size of the profession should be seen as an issue under Article 1
of the Code of Ethics because size prevents us from meeting our mission to
serve human rights and social justice."'0 2 The victims of many of Japan's
social problems are largely hidden from view. Wronged consumers, the
handicapped,'0 3 those who experience long pre-trial detentions, and those
who have suffered workplace injuries, sexual harassment or job

"9 Ramseyer, supra note 46, at 526.
too Ramseyer, supra note 46, at 534.
Mot Ramseyer, supra note 46, at 538.
102
Leonard, supra note 9, at 98.
103
The plight of the disabled in Japan is a clear case of societal injustice which Japanese lawyers
need to address. Japan has no law protecting its disabled citizens from discrimination. Japan lags far
behind the United States in making buildings accessible to wheelchairs. The social ostracism of the
disabled in Japan is comparable to racial discrimination. Extreme examples of isolation exist even in the
context of the family. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Prejudice Deepens Pain for Japan's Disabled, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1996, at Al, A4.
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discrimination all lack a voice in the Japanese legal system.' °4 As defenders
against injustice, Japanese lawyers constitute a group of highly educated,
well organized professionals. Given their ability to access the legal system,
and contrasted with the average citizen's inability to do so, the lawyer is
uniquely positioned to promote justice in the Japanese society. To achieve
this potential, the Japanese bar must increase its membership, thereby
extending to all Japanese citizens the protection of the law.

104
Leonard, supra note 9, at 98; see also Leon Wolff, Eastern Twists on Western Concepts:
Equality Jurisprudence and Sexual Harrassment in Japan, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 509 (1996).
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APPENDIX

1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

1o5

(1994).

3,668
4,761
5,138
5,250
6,347
6,737
6,920
7,109
7,858
8,363
10,909
10,762
11,686
12,698
13,644
14,867
16,460
17,727
18,453
20,160

0 5

272
253
224
250
264
297
286
346
319
345
380
459
496
508
526
554
537
525
501
507

7.42
5.31
4.36
4.76
4.16
4.41
4.13
4.87
4.06
4.13
3.48
4.27
4.24
4.00
3.86
3.73
3.26
2.96
2.72
2.51

Landers, supra note 2, at BI; JOHN 0. HALEY, LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 9
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APPENDIX, CON'T.

I

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

1
T

22,336
23,425
25,339
26,708
27,791
29,088
29,214
29,390
28,622
28,656
27,810
26,317
25,138
-23,956
23,855
23,904
24,690
23,352
23,202
22,900
22,596
23,435

533
537
537
491

2.39
2.29
2.12
1.84

465
465
485
503
486
446
457
448
453
486
486
489
512
506
499
605
630

1.60
1.59
1.65
1.76
1.76
1.60
1.74
1.78
1.89
2.04
2.03
1.98
2.20
2.18
2.18
2.67
2.68

